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THE THREE PRIMARY LAWS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Professor J. W. Ashley, in the preface to his *English Economic History*, writes as follows: "Two causes above all others, sometimes working separately, sometimes in conjunction, have gradually modified the character of economic science. These two causes are the growing importance of historical studies and the application to society of the idea of evolution."

This has resulted, according to this same writer, in "a divergence of opinion as to the proper method to be pursued in the investigation of present phenomena. There are many intermediate shades of opinion, many interesting attempts at eclectic compromise, but in the main economists tend to turn in one of two opposite directions: either they use the method of deduction practiced by Ricardo and defended by J. S. Mill and Cairnes, or they proceed by the way of historical inquiry and the observation of facts." "The historical school, in the strict sense of the word, holds that it is no longer worth while framing general formula as to the relations between individuals in a given society like the old laws of rent, wages and profits; and that what they must attempt to discover are the laws of social development—that is to say, generalization as to the stages through which the economic life of society has actually passed. They believe that knowledge like this will enable them the better to understand the difficulties of the present."

The case here urged against the orthodox school of economists is, in brief, that they only had in mind that form of society which prevailed in England in the latter part of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In a word, they completely lost sight of the important fact that society is a growing organism and so were betrayed into assuming that what was true for the England of their day was necessarily true for all societies at all stages in their development. It is also charged, and with some measure of truth, that the orthodox economists were betrayed into this error by their too exclusive use of deductive methods. A more frequent use of the inductive method, it is claimed, would have revealed the obvious fact that societies rise, flourish and decay, and hence that

generalizations which are true for one stage of their existence are not necessarily true for all other stages.

That the historical school entered a timely protest against the over-accenting of the deductive method of inquiry no one will deny. But after all it can only be a question of accent and not primarily a question of method. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how mature men of scholarly training can be betrayed into insisting that there is a necessary antagonism between the deductive and inductive methods of inquiry. One might as well talk of reproduction by the sole efforts of one or the other sex as to talk of developing thought by the exclusive employment of either method of inquiry. How, it might be asked, can there be an intelligent observation of facts save as these facts fall into some orderly arrangement in the mind, or are seen through the medium of some incipient or tentative theory in regard to these facts. At bottom, therefore, there can be no question of the exclusive use of either method, though particular men, because of the natural bent of their minds, may over-accent one or the other method. When this happens, as it does very frequently, their work must be supplemented, and corrected if need be, by the work of those who tend to employ the contrary method. It must, however, be borne in mind that the too exclusive use of either method is rather a confession of our own mental limitation than a special endorsement of that method.

Most of those who tend to accent the deductive method have clearly recognized its limitations, but while confessing their many sins of omission and commission, they have continued on their way in good-natured tolerance of the more vehement attacks upon this method. Indeed, so long have they persisted in this easy-going tolerance that the belief has gone forth "that sufferance is the badge of all their tribe."

In the present paper I shall attempt to show : first, that in accepting Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest as a good and sufficient explanation of the phenomena of social progress, the historical school has been betrayed into the very same error as that of which they have convicted the orthodox economists. Like the latter, the historical school has assumed that a theory of progress, which is only true for certain stages in social development, is necessarily true for all stages or has universal validity. Secondly, an attempt will be made to show that a complete understanding of the

larger social evolution is impossible without some acquaintance with those very "laws of rent, wages and profits" which the historical school would dismiss with such scant courtesy.

With regard to the first half of our self-appointed task, the case rests primarily upon the contention that the historical school has for the most part contented itself with the theory of evolution proposed by Mr. Darwin. In doing so it has assumed that all social progress is due to a struggle for the food supply, and so to that "survival of the fittest" which necessarily involves the killing off of the lower classes whenever population presses too hard upon subsistence. In so far as any member of the historical school has repudiated this doctrine our case does not hold as against him, but while not a few protests have been entered against this theory, they have been filed for the most part by writers of the socialistic school or by those more or less in sympathy with them, few such protests having been entered by accredited members of the "historical school in the strict sense of the word."

What, then, in a concise way, is this theory of progress by "the survival of the fittest?" On page 3 of the introduction to his "Origin of Species," Mr. Darwin writes: "In the next chapter, the struggle for existence among all organic beings throughout the world, which invariably follows from the high geometric ratio of their increase, will be considered. This is the doctrine of Malthus applied to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom. As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive, and as consequently there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong principle of inheritances any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form."

The first thing to note in this is the fact that Darwin here clearly recognizes that "this is the doctrine of Malthus." It is, therefore, strange to say the least, that economists should have accepted a theory of progress which is confessedly based upon a long-since discarded economic doctrine. Malthus, in the earlier editions of his famous essay, appears as the champion of the agrarian interests. This is due in part to his environment as a country clergyman and in part to the reaction in thought and feeling which had set in because of the

excesses of the French Revolution. His social ideal was a society in which the landed aristocracy dominated the situation. A society in which progress must at best be slow, and which in his earlier editions he practically regarded as hopeless so far as the lower classes were concerned. Later on, when the industrial revolution in England had gotten well under way, Malthus saw that even with their unsanitary factories and homes, their long hours, etc., there was some improvement in the condition of the laboring classes. Not all that might be desired, it is true, but still there had been at least some amelioration of their hard lot. Again, when he turned to French experience, he was forced to admit that, despite all its excesses and subsequent retrograde movements, the Revolution had left the lower classes in a better condition than they had ever before enjoyed. And so, in his later edition, we find him hopeful that even the lowliest may enjoy a surplus above a mere existence.

But while the hopelessness of the first edition was thus early abandoned by Malthus, the concept he had had in mind fitted in so nicely with biological phenomena that we find Darwin writing on page 60 of his "Origin of Species": "It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom, for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food and no prudential restraints upon marriages." In a word, we here have Darwin's tacit recognition of the fact that while this theory fits in so well with biological phenomena, it may be largely offset, so far as human society is concerned, by the intelligent volitions of mankind. And yet not a few economists have continued to insist upon the theory of the survival of the fittest as a good and sufficient explanation of all social progress, and this despite its signal failure to explain the more complex phenomena of a modern society.

Take the case of an industrial movement that is still under way. When the development of the cotton industry in the southern part of the United States was first mooted, I took occasion to ask an intelligent New England manufacturer what the effect of such a movement would be upon the New England factories; would it drive them out of the business or force them to remove their plants to the Southern states? He answered, "It will not necessarily have either effect. It is much more likely to force us out of the manufacturing of the cheaper grades of goods and into the manufacturing of a higher grade of goods, the higher intelligence of our New England mill

hands giving us an advantage over our southern competitors in the higher grade of goods." Note, then, that progress is here due not to the pressing down or killing off of the lower type but to the latter pressing up against a higher type and forcing it to exert itself more effectively. This experience is, of course, a common one, and furnishes one of the stock arguments against the excessive protection of any industry, to wit, that it enervates men, and so prevents that improvement in method and technique which might otherwise be expected. And when it is answered that home competition will effect the same result, we only admit a principle as general as that of the "survival of the fittest," namely, that progress depends at least as much upon the pressure from below as upon the pressure from above.

Again take the case of the New England mill hands. What has become of the native New England boys and girls that forsook the farms for life and wages in the mill district? As is well known they have been replaced by successive invasions of various nationalities, at one time by the Irish immigrants and later by Canadians. Does this mean that the native mill hands were forced down and out; killed off, as it were, by a pressure from above? That they were driven out is true, but by a lower and not by a higher type, and what is more to the point, they were driven not *down* but *up* into employments and positions of greater trust and responsibility.

Again, what has become of the Irish immigrant who a few years ago was the ditch-digger and track hand, "the hewer of wood and the drawer of water?" He too has been driven out by emigrants from southern Europe, or by a lower type, but he too has been driven not down but up into more desirable fields of employments.

In Philadelphia there has been, in recent years, a very interesting movement of population. During and after the War of the Rebellion the district from Lombard street to Christian street and east of Ninth street was occupied by a none too desirable negro population. West of Broad the population was a thrifty, self-respecting, Scotch-Irish element, who so dominated this section of the city in political matters that the Seventh Ward was facetiously styled Tyrone County. The first change in this distribution of the population occurred when the Italians came in, and were willing to pay more for very limited accommodations near the centre of the city than even the negro was willing to pay. This forced the negroes west

towards Broad street. Later the Russian Jews came in and outbid the Italians for accommodations in the slums. This forced the latter westward, and made them again press upon the negroes. They in turn went west of Broad street and forced the original Scotch-Irish element into much better quarters west of the river. In each and every case a higher type was forced out by a lower type, but in each and every case the higher type was forced up, and not down, by the competition with a lower type. Nor are these special or exceptional instances. On the contrary, they are typical of a method of evolution that prevails in all advanced and rapidly progressing societies. Where then shall we turn for a theory of evolution that will account for these phenomena?¹

Primarily there are but two theories of evolution that have found any general acceptance. These are Darwin's "survival of the fittest" and Lamarck's theory of the more or less conscious adjustment of the organism to its environment. Darwin, in reviewing Lamarck's contributions to the literature of the subject, found that "He first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability of all changes in the organic as well as in the inorganic world being the result of law and not of miraculous intervention." "With respect to the means of modification he attributed something to the direct action of the physical conditions of life, something to the crossing of already existing forms and much to use and disuse, that is, to the effect of habit." Darwin, having in mind biological phenomena of the lower orders, finds it "preposterous" to attempt to explain them by "the effects of external conditions or of habit or the volition of the plant itself."² ("Origin of Species," pages 2 and 3.)

¹It may be interesting to note that the first to recognize the importance of these facts was Dr. S. N. Patten, a writer who has not generally been credited by the Historical School with an over zealous regard for mere facts.

²Herbert Spencer, finds more to commend in Lamarck's theory. Starting with the necessary instability of the homogeneous, Spencer finds that changes in the environment, by affecting the food supply, must react upon and produce changes in the included organisms. But as all change is not necessarily in the line of greater heterogeneity or of progress, Spencer continues: "Probably in most instances the modified type will not be appreciably more heterogeneous than the original, but it must now and then occur that some division of a species falling into circumstances which give it rather more complex experiences and demanding actions somewhat more involved will have certain of its organs further differentiated in proportionately small degrees—will become slightly more heterogeneous." "First Principles," page 247. The phrase, "it must now and then occur," would seem to involve Spencer in the same chapter of accidents to which Darwin refers us; but the passage as a whole commits Spencer to the Lamarckian contention that progress is due, in part at least, to the attempts of the organism to adjust itself to its changed environment.

The crucial point in both of these theories is this: how does it happen that the change in the organism is in the direction of progress or of greater heterogeneity, to use Spencer's phrase? Darwin, starting with Malthus' assumption of a limited food supply, finds that this must result in an ever "recurring struggle for existence," and hence, "Any being if it vary, however slightly, in a manner profitable to itself under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected." Note, then, that so far as Darwin is concerned the variation of any being in a manner profitable to itself is left entirely to the chapter of accidents. Lamarck, on the other hand, had in mind a more or less conscious endeavor on the part of the organism to adapt itself to the more complex environment in which it finds itself placed.

The failure of the first of these theories when applied to the complex phenomena of a modern society has already been shown. Nor is any argument necessary to show that it is in such a society, by improvements in methods, machines, etc., that Lamarck's concept finds its fullest application. It is, however, well to note that the lower we descend in the scale of existence the more important is the part played by Darwin's "survival of the fittest."³ Surely, the historical school, in so far as it has accepted Darwin's "survival of the fittest" as a satisfactory explanation of social progress in a modern society, stands convicted on our first count. Like the orthodox economists of old, they have assumed universal validity for a generalization that is only true, in any complete sense, for the earlier stages of social evolution.

This brings us to our second contention, to wit, that no complete understanding of the problem of social evolution is possible without some clear notion as to what is meant by those laws of rent, wages and profit which the historical school have so lightly "whistled down the wind." The theme, of course, is a larger one than can possibly receive adequate treatment within the limits of a single article. On the other hand, such a rapid sketch as is possible within these limits may have some advantages, and will at least serve to make good the above contention.

³This thought has been worked out by a number of writers. Spencer, in his "Data of Ethics," has shown that all organic development involves a growth in the self-determining power of the individual. Lester F. Ward, in his "Psychic Factors of Civilization," has more fully expanded the same thought.

It may fairly be urged that prolonged social progress depends upon the existence of a continually recurring social surplus, and upon the manner of its distribution among the several parties to its production. If this is true, it follows that some knowledge of the laws of rent, wages and profit is necessary to a right understanding of the problem of social progress, for in the last resort these laws are but our attempts to determine how the distribution of this social surplus has been, is, and should be effected.

Starting, then, with the premise that social progress depends upon the existence of a social surplus or upon a continual increase in the material resources of society, it might be urged that there are only three possible variations in the increase of these material resources, namely, a decreasing rate of increase, an increasing rate of increase and a fixed rate of increase. Or, stated in more familiar economic terms, we have in the first case a society progressing under the law of diminishing returns; in the second a society progressing under the law of increasing returns, and in the third instance a society progressing under the law of constant returns. A word of caution may here be necessary. One is prone to think of the "law of diminishing returns" as meaning a decrease in the absolute amount of the social surplus, but as this would imply a retrograding society, it must be clearly distinguished from the concept that we here have in mind. In all three instances we are dealing with a progressing society, hence the "law of diminishing returns" here means not a decrease in the absolute amount of the social surplus but a decrease in its rate of increase. In the same way the second form of progress involves an increase in this rate of increase, while the third implies a constant rate of increase of the social surplus. Now unless we can show some other primary variation in the rate of increase of the social surplus than those here enumerated, we are constrained to admit that so far as social progress depends upon an increase in the social surplus, this progress will manifest itself in three, and in only three, primary forms. And as a corollary to this, the form which the social surplus tends to take will show a like variation, as in rent, profit, etc. With this in mind let us proceed to a very rapid scanning of the conditions that must prevail under each of these three forms of social progress.

In a society progressing under the law of diminishing returns property is largely in land. Agrarian interests dominate the eco-

nomie, political and social life of such a society. Population tends to press upon subsistence, and the struggle for existence is so severe that those below are apt to be pressed down and out by those above. The explanation of such progress as does take place is to be found for the most part in Darwin's "survival of the fittest." Conscious adjustment of the individual to his environment here plays but an unimportant part. The organism that *happens* to vary "in a way profitable to itself," or in harmony with its changing environment, survives and tends to propagate its kind. But as all is here left to the chapter of accidents, the number that go down in the struggle is great and the progress correspondingly slow. In such a society there is an ever recurring tendency for those below to return to a condition of serfdom or slavery.

On the other hand, in a society progressing under the law of increasing returns, property is more largely in the machines and tools of production. Commercial and manufacturing interests determine the economic and political policy of the society, though the landed aristocracy may long continue to dictate its social precedents and laws. The struggle for existence is less severe, being relieved by inventions and improvements as well as by self-restraint in the matter of reproduction. Population no longer presses so hard upon subsistence. The lower classes no longer perish in mass from a lack of food, but instead the upper classes are in danger of being killed off by over-feeding. Again progress is effected by the lower classes advancing and forcing the upper classes to still greater effort if they are to hold their own in this most hopeful struggle for existence. In a word, the explanation of progress is no longer to be found in Darwin's chapter of accidents but in Lamarck's conscious adjustment of the individual to his environment, and hence we find a much more rapid rate of progress in individual and social well being.

The first two forms of progress are more or less familiar concepts, but just what we are to understand by a society progressing under the "law of constant returns" or a fixed rate of increase of the social surplus is not so manifest. It might be said it is a society in which we tend to realize the conditions of free competition, and when so defined the concept seems a little more familiar. But, after all, one is not entirely satisfied with this unless he can see just what the connection is between free competition and a society progressing

under the "law of constant returns." Our immediate task is therefore to make this as clear as possible.

Under the law of "diminishing returns" an increase in the supply of commodities can only be effected at an increased cost or price, but under the law of "increasing returns," the supply of commodities is increased without an increase in cost or price. If a shoe manufacturer invents a machine that will turn out one hundred pairs of shoes for the former cost of one pair he is forced to lower the price somewhat, in order to find a market for his greatly increased supply of shoes. But while society as a whole is thus more largely benefited by the law of increasing than by the law of decreasing returns, yet this latter carries with it a more or less serious disadvantage. Progress is here effected by improvements that occur now in this and now in that industry, never in all industries at one and the same time, and never for any long time at the same rate in any one industry. So long as the improvement in any one industry is maintained, those in control of this particular industry enjoy a monopoly advantage in exchanging their goods for the product of less favored industries.

In consequence of this the productive power of society is unduly stimulated along these particular lines, and for a time proceeds at a rapidly increasing rate.

Under the "law of diminishing returns," production lags behind consumption; under the law of "increasing returns," consumption for a time at least lags behind production, and so we have those alternating periods of activity and depression, periods during which the productive power increases at a very rapid rate, followed by periods during which it is forced to lie dormant, until the standard of life or the consuming power of society has been sufficiently advanced to take up this increased production. In the meanwhile the plants that have been multiplied out of all proportion to the consuming power of society are compelled to lie idle; laborers who have acquired special skill in the handling of these plants are thrown out of employment, and their special skill, acquired at some cost, both to themselves and their employers, is rendered useless. And so society finds that when the full period of activity and depression is completed it has made less progress than it might have made had it proceeded at a slower but more constant rate in the increase of the social surplus. What then are the conditions that are necessary

to the maintenance of a constant rate of increase of the social surplus?

Let us assume a society in which the advance or the improvement in method and technique is equal throughout the entire field of industry. This is, of course, an assumption that will never be completely realized in the facts of industrial life, nevertheless it is interesting to us, since we are here dealing with tendencies and approximations and not with the absolute realization of social possibilities. In such a society the various improvements will greatly add to the total utilities, but will not in any way affect the ratio of exchange of the various commodities. In a word, since no one can secure a monopoly advantage because of these improvements, we here tend to realize the conditions of free competition. The over-stimulation of the productive powers of society, due to the monopoly advantage enjoyed by the few under the second form of progress, tends to disappear, and society tends more and more to realize that ideal of progress which can only be found under the law of constant returns. Here every increase in the productive power of society results in a corresponding advance in the standard of life of the whole society. In a word, production and consumption here tend to keep pace with each other. It may be well to note that *uniform* improvements and a *constant* rate of increase of the social surplus are not here employed as interchangeable terms. On the contrary, the first stands in causal relation to the second. Uniform improvements eliminate monopoly advantage or tend to effect a more equitable distribution. This brings about a progressing equilibrium between production and consumption, and so substitutes a constant rate of increase for the alternating periods of boom and depression.

To all this it may be answered that in these latter days the whole drift of industrial phenomena is away from the ideal of free competition. The organization of enormous aggregations of capital into sugar trusts, steel trusts, etc., means the stifling of free competition. In a narrow view of the facts there seems to be no escape from this conclusion, save under the assumption of socialist writers that all this tends towards government ownership or socialism. That some progress will be made toward the public ownership of certain industries, like telegraph and telephone lines, railroads, etc., seems now quite probable, but that all industry will be thus absorbed may seriously be doubted despite the present trend of events. Any such

scheme meets with the serious difficulty that social progress depends in part at least upon an increase in the supply of capital. This in last resorts implies a saving by the *marginal saver*⁴ of the resources in consumption of goods and a dedication of these resources to production. This is an individual act, and as human nature is constituted, will not long be performed without the stimulus that results from the profitable employment of these savings in productive processes. If this act of saving is not performed by the marginal saver, there will be a decrease in the rate of increase of capital goods and so of social progress. It is this that constrains us to look for some other solution or outcome for the present tendency towards larger combinations and greater concentration in industrial life.

If the great combinations of these latter days have come to stay they must eventually be transformed from stock-jobbing schemes into permanent investments. Those in control will be constrained to bring about such conditions as will insure a regular and permanent income. So long as industry was divided up among many promoters each was comparatively free to seek his own monopoly advantage without serious concern as to whether or not he is impoverishing others. But as large ranges of industry are brought under a single control, the effect of this egoism will become more manifest. For this destruction of the purchasing power of others must eventually react on general industry and bring about those periods when most goods seem to be a drug on the market.

It will soon become evident that in order to supply the abnormal demand of the more active periods, enormous investments have been made in plants that are absolutely idle during the long periods of depression. If the economy in management that is now effected by these great combinations is a sufficient reason for their existence, then surely the much greater economy that would result from regularity in production, thus preventing the unnecessary duplication of expensive plants, cannot fail to compel the attention of those in control of these great combinations. They will be constrained to realize that an arbitrary exercise of their monopoly power carries with it the seeds of their own destruction if they have in mind the permanency of their investments. So, too, a more liberal spirit in dealing with their employees will be forced upon them, not alone

⁴See the present writer's discussion of this problem in his "Value and Distribution."

by the pressure, both political and industrial, that will be exercised by organized labor, but by the gradual recognition of the fact that if the products of all industries are to find purchasers, the employees must be allowed the means with which to purchase and the time in which to enjoy these commodities. I do not mean that the men in control of industry will suddenly become altruistic or that organized labor will shortly find its occupation gone. On the contrary, the pressure that organized labor can exert will be of growing importance for a long time to come, but it will meet with less intemperate opposition from employers as industrial combinations grow in strength and in that broader policy which the demand for permanent investments will compel their management to adopt. In a word, these various motives and influences will tend to bring about a realization of that ideal of social progress which is found alone under the law of constant returns.

Note, then, that under the "law of decreasing returns" progress is best effected by a more or less complete ignoring of the welfare of others. Indeed, in extreme cases progress is only possible by the heartless killing off of those less strong in limb and brain. The weak are mercilessly forced to the ground, and society in its slow sad progress towards better things is compelled ruthlessly to stride over the prostrate forms of those who have gone down in this fierce struggle for existence. In progress under the "law of increasing returns," this is impossible. The motive that prompts men to improve the methods of production may still be largely egoistic. Yet the very nature of these improvements forces men to market their increased supply of goods at a lower price. It is doubtless true that he who controls the new and cheaper methods of production would gladly secure for himself the entire benefit of the improvement, but under the "law of increasing returns," and for the reasons just set forth, this is impossible. In a word, the conditions under which the *entrepreneur* labors forces him to a pseudo-altruism that is not realized under the "law of diminishing returns." In a society progressing under the "law of constant returns" still further progress is made towards altruism. The welfare of society at large becomes a condition precedent to the success of those who would exploit that society. As the men in control of the great industrial combinations increase the scope of their interests and seek to give them permanence, they will be forced

to grant to others the power to purchase and the time to consume the products of these various industries.

It is generally held by those who lay much stress upon inductive methods that society progressed from feudalism, or the domination of the landed aristocracy, to the domination of the bourgeoisie, and that in the further evolution of society we must look to see the fourth estate come into its own. In the present paper, starting with the assumption that social progress is conditioned upon the existence of a social surplus, we have been led by *a priori* considerations to much the same conclusion. We find that the above forms of society correspond quite closely with societies progressing under the laws of decreasing, increasing and constant returns. We have seen, too, that the law of evolution varies for these different forms of society, and, after all that has been said, it hardly needs to be urged that the form which the social surplus takes will suffer a like variation. In the first instance land rents are dominant, in the second profit, while in the third, where we approximate the conditions of free competition, both rent and profits tend to disappear, being replaced by the normal surpluses "interest on capital" and "gain of labor." For a fuller exposition of these latter surpluses I must refer the reader to my work on "Value and Distribution," in which I have attempted to show that in last resort these normal surpluses are the only ones that are absolutely essential to progress. At the same time rent and profit as there defined have been in the past, and probably ever will be in the future, the usual accompaniment of that very progress which their excess tends to retard.

Here, then, we would rest our case against the "historical school in the strict sense of the word," for I think it has been shown that, so far as they have accepted Darwin's "survival of the fittest" as a satisfactory explanation of social progress, they have assumed universal validity for a theory of progress, which at best has but limited application in the field of social phenomena. Secondly, that no complete understanding of the problem of social progress is possible without some acquaintance with those laws of rent, wages and profits which the orthodox economist labored so hard to formulate.

In conclusion let me add one word of caution. The distinction of the four estates, though valid enough, must not be too strenuously insisted upon. While a modern society may be *dominated* by any one of the three laws of progress, according to the stage of its

development, it is not probable that it will ever be entirely free from the action of the other two laws. This means, of course, that in any modern society all three forms of evolution are in operation at one and the same time, and it is this that must always render the study of social evolution such a difficult problem. On the other hand, a recognition of these three forms of progress and their mutual interaction will, I think, be found necessary to any hopeful investigation in the field of social evolution.

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